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ABSTRACT 
 
   
In the last few years the main topics of discussion related to the European Economic and 
Monetary Union have focused on whether it will be able to survive the current crisis or whether 
or not the countries were ready to form a Monetary Union in the first place. There has also been 
mention of member countries having surpassed the public debt and budget deficit thresholds, 60 
percent and 3 percent respectively, established by the Stability and Growth Pact. However, there 
has not been much focus on what the figures, established as limits in order to ensure fiscal 
stability, actually account for. In this paper the author analyzes the compliance of a group of 
member countries with the limits established in the Stability and Growth Pact on public debt and 
budget deficit. Based on statistical data available this author compares the economic 
performance of several member countries at different stages of the business cycle using 60 
percent public debt and 3 percent budget deficit in relationship to GDP as the points of 
comparison.  The establishment of a differentiated scale, which would respond to the stage of the 
business cycle a country might find itself in, is proposed. In the analysis one might observe that 
even among those countries considered to be very fiscally sound there have been those that at 
some point have, since their adoption of the euro, surpassed these limits. While the 3 and 60 
percent look for fiscal stability they don't seem to account for economic slowdowns. The 
parameters should be reflective of a particular step in the business cycle, thus allowing for more 
flexibility in response actions. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 The creations of the European Union and the European financial crisis have elicited an 
extensive literature in the main newspapers and journals specialized in economic and financial 
issues.  However, most of these articles or papers seem to address the possible demise of the euro 
and the Eurozone or the underlying problems of the EU system that have made this crisis 
unavoidable.  The parameters that have to be met in order to gain entry into the Eurozone, such 
as the 60 percent public debt and 3 percent budget deficit, are cited but mostly in relation to the 
membership criteria for EU members to gain entry into the Eurozone. The author has not found 
recent papers criticizing the adoption of these parameters. 
Many economists seem to agree that the European Union was not ready to become a 
monetary union as it fails to meet some of the essential criteria for establishing an optimal 
currency area.  As important as identifying these underlying systemic problems is, it is also 
important to consider factors that can be modified in the short-run that might lead to a better 
functioning of the Eurozone. This paper will focus on modifications to the public debt and 
budget deficit as percentages of the GDP as parameters required for membership in the 
Eurozone.  The current values assigned as thresholds for these parameters do not take into 
consideration the effect of stages of growth and recession in the business cycle and implicitly 
assume that economies will fundamentally be in good standing without any crisis.   
 Consequently, the hypothesis of this paper is to prove that the current criteria for 
Eurozone membership are too strict because they do not take into consideration recessionary 
stages of the business cycle.   
 Chapter one starts by presenting a literature review of works related to the relevance and 
adequacy of the reference values established under the Maastricht Treaty. The second part of the 
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chapter addresses the theoretical aspects of creating a monetary union made up by several 
countries, and analyzes the financial and economic implications for its members.    Due to the 
nature of a monetary union, fiscal policy becomes the only stabilizing policy tool available to 
member countries.  This part of the chapter also looks at how fiscal policy is normally used by 
states and why it tends to come into conflict with the practice of balancing the budget.  The last 
part of the chapter looks at the role of economic parameters in monitoring the economic behavior 
of a particular country.   
 Chapter two presents the case of the European Union as a current example of a monetary 
union.  This chapter presents the development of the monetary union from the European Coal & 
Steel Community to the establishment of the European Union under the Maastricht Treaty.  The 
second part of this chapter presents Paul Krugman’s analysis of the Eurozone’s lack of 
fulfillment of the conditions for an optimal currency union.  The last part of the chapter analyzes 
the division of the Eurozone into Northern and Southern countries based on their economic 
positions and performances.   
 The third chapter analyzes: (a) the impact of an economic downturn, such as that 
triggered by the American slowdown in 2008-2009, on the budget deficit and public debt as 
percentages of GDP as leading parameters to determine the acceptance of a European country 
into the EU; (b) how the creation of the Eurozone artificially reduced the bond yields of the 
Southern governments and facilitated the emergence of housing bubbles; (c) the bailouts given to 
Greece and Portugal as a clear violation of the principles (stipulations) established by the 
Eurozone and the resulting political conflicts; and (d) the implications of the creation of 
Eurobonds on the political gridlock prevalent in the EU, as well as the roles of the German 
Chancellor and the ECB President as two key players in the Eurozone. 
	   3	  
 The fourth and final chapter looks at the different phases of the business cycle in 
contraposition to the requirements for Eurozone membership in the context of these different 
phases.  The chapter ends with a detailed data analysis of the economic performance of several 
Eurozone member countries at different stages of the business cycle, setting the stage for the 
conclusion that the parameters established are not flexible enough to reflect the economic reality 
of a member country. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Theoretical Conditions Stemming From the Creation of a Monetary Union 
 
 
 Literature Review 
 
 The material available in relation to the adequacy of the parameters established as part of 
the membership criteria is limited, even if the mention of the debt and deficit membership 
criteria has been extensive since the adoption of the euro.   However, there have been some 
authors who have discussed important topics related to it, such as where do the debt and deficit 
reference values derive from. In his paper European Union at the End of 1997: Who is within the 
public finance “sustainability” zone? Luigi L. Pasinetti (1998) analyzes, based on the growth 
rate, public debt and total deficit, where the future Eurozone members fell in relation to the 
sustainability zone defined by their individual growth rate, debt and deficit circumstances. He 
refers to the public debt and budget deficit parameters when he explains how he arrived at the 
sustainability relation.   
Pasinetti refers to the use of the 60 percent and 3 percent figures as something that 
emerged, not as a definite set of values that would guarantee the sustainability of the European 
Monetary Union and the euro but, as a combination of values that represented a particular point 
within the boundaries that defined a particular public finance sustainability zone.1  At the 
beginning of the paper the author proceeds to provide the reader with an explanation of the 
rationale behind the figures.  The 60 percent represented the average public debt/GDP ratio 
among the future members of the European Union at the time the Maastricht Treaty was being 
drawn. Based on the relationship that he establishes throughout the paper among the growth rate, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1 Pasinetti, L. L. (1998, March). European Union at the End of 1997: Who is within the Public	  Finance 
“Sustainability” Zone? Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. 51 (204), 19.	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public debt and public deficit, he accepts 3 percent as a ratio that will maintain the public 
debt/GDP ratio either constant or decreasing based on what could have been the rate of growth at 
the time (based on the real rate of growth and inflation).2 
The author provides an analysis of the role of the public debt and deficit figures in 
accordance to their implied role as written down in the Treaty of Maastricht (art. 104c) and the 
Annex Protocol. Pasinetti argues that one can infer that the purpose of these figures is to prevent 
the creation of “excessive government deficits”; he then proceeds to briefly explain what would 
be considered an “excessive” deficit in terms of the public debt/GDP ratio. 3  Even as Pasinetti 
provides these important factors in relationship to the origin and the role of the figures, he does 
not compare the European countries’ performances at different points in time since the 
establishment of the Treaty.  The paper provides a basis for beginning to understand why the 
parameters now in use were chosen in the first place.  However, the data and graphs presented 
were analyzed before the euro was adopted.  The real economic performance of the member 
economies versus the expected ideal compliance with the established parameters is what interests 
this author and what she addresses in this paper. 
 An author that more directly addresses the adequateness of the fiscal framework 
established by the EMU is Otmar Issing (2004) in The Stability and Growth Pact: The 
appropriate fiscal framework for the EMU.  In this paper Issing argues that the EMU’s fiscal 
framework, including the limits on public debt and budget deficit “ensure sustainability.”4  He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 2 Pasinetti, 19. 
 
 3 Ibid., 18. 
 
 4 Issing, O.  (2004). The Stability and Growth Pact: The appropriate fiscal framework for EMU. 
International Economics and Economic Policy, 1(1), 9-13. 
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provides three reasons as to why the reference values for deficit and debt in combination with an 
adequate monitoring system are appropriate for creating stable economic policies.   
Firstly, Issing states that the establishment of clear parameters facilitates the monitoring 
process.  According to Issing fiscal rules in the case of a monetary union must fulfill a series of 
conditions. Among these conditions he cites “the budgetary balances in the member countries 
and in the currency union as a whole should be able to behave in a cyclically appropriate way.” 5  
Secondly, he argues that in principle the public debt and budget deficit reference values 
established in the Maastricht Treaty Annex Protocol satisfy the conditions he describes and that 
even if the numerical values were different they would probably still face criticism. Thirdly, 
Issing argues that the 3 percent limit on budget deficit is often decontextualized and not 
considered in relation to the goal of wanting member countries to have a balanced budget or a 
budget surplus under “normal economic circumstances”.6 Issing parts from the assumption that 
member countries will achieve a balanced budget or a budget surplus to argue that additional 
flexibility is created in the possible scenario that the automatic stabilizers are activated. In that 
same section Issing states that,  
For particular deep or rapid economic recession, the Pact foresees special  provisions. 
 These requirements and criteria and their application to all the euro area  countries help 
 to ensure that the aggregate fiscal balance of the euro area remains  appropriate over the 
 cycle, despite the national autonomy.7                                                                              
 
The article refers to the established public debt and budget deficit values as the basis that would 
allow for flexibility in the application of fiscal policy. Issing also argues that the Stability and 
Growth Pact did take the possibility of recession into consideration by setting special provisions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 5 Issing, 11. 
 
 6 Ibid. 
 
 7 Ibid.	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to address the possible deviation from the 3 and 60 percentage values.  However, in this 
particular work the author does not address what are the provisions that are in place in the case of 
a recession in the European Monetary Union.       
From the article the reader can infer that for the author it is important that the fiscal 
balance follows the (business) cycle as he keeps making reference to it. Even though Issing 
analyses the rationale and the advantage of having the limits on budget deficit and public debt be 
3 percent and the 60 percent respectively, he does it within the realm of what should happen in 
“principle”.  He only dedicates a few lines to mention the effect of the fiscal framework in the 
actual practice of its implementation.  Issing does not even consider the possibility that the fiscal 
difficulties of some member countries at the time the article was written could be related to the 
fiscal framework established in the Stability and Growth Pact. For him, the member country is 
responsible for any fiscal difficulties, as he implied that this would signal a failure to meet the 
preconditions of having a balanced budget during growth periods.8 
Another author who also writes in favor of the fiscal framework established by the Treaty 
of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth Pact is Mauro Visaggio (2004) in his paper Does 
Stability and Growth Pact Provide an Adequate and Consistent Fiscal Rule?  Visaggio examines 
the adequacy and the consistency of the fiscal rule with which members of the EMU have to 
comply.  Just as Pasinetti analyzed the fiscal framework in terms of sustainability Visaggio 
examines the fiscal rules in terms of ensuring the sustainability of the public debt.  However 
unlike Issing who supports the numerical reference values provided by the Annex Protocol of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   8 Issing, 11. 	  
 8	  
Maastricht Treaty, as a ceiling for debt and deficit, Visaggio is indifferent to the actual numerical 
values.  He is concerned with these values only in terms of the possible burden on society.9 
Willem H. Buiter and Clemens Grafe (2004) criticize the fiscal framework established by 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact.  In their article Patching up the Pact 
they argue that the existing criteria are not designed to address the economic reality of future 
member countries that are dissimilar in economic or financial position to the current members.  
Even though this article is primarily concerned with the fiscal criteria as they relate to EU 
candidates, it uses the public debt and budget deficit reference values as a starting point for the 
authors’ argument.  They criticize the lack of clarity concerning the reasoning behind the public 
debt and budget deficit values. Like Pasinetti they conclude that the 60 percent debt ceiling is 
most likely a reflection of the average public debt in the area at the time the Maastricht Treaty 
was being drafted. Unlike with the public debt ceiling the authors mention that they found no 
historical benchmark related to 3 percent being chosen as the budget deficit ceiling.10 This article 
does not delve deeper into why the established fiscal framework, and proposed debt and deficit 
ceilings, provide an inadequate framework for accession candidates and an adequate one for 
current members.   
When examining the literature available on the topic of the numerical reference values, as 
well as member countries’ compliance with them, it is noteworthy to observe that most of the 
material available predates the 2008 global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis the 
European Union is going through at the moment.  Even though there are authors who have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 9 Visaggio, M. (2004, June). Does Stability and Growth Pact Provide an Adequate and Consistent Fiscal 
Rule? Macroeconomics, EconWPA, 1-32. Retrieved from 
http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0407008 
 10 Buiter, W. H. & Grafe, C. (2004, March). Patching up the Pact: Some Suggestions for Enhancing Fiscal 
Sustainability and Macroeconomic Stability in an Enlarged European Union. Economics of Transition, 12 (1), 67-
102. 
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criticized the chosen numerical reference values, especially as the reasoning behind their choice 
tends to be somewhat evasive, there are other authors that support their implementation as 
preventing Eurozone member countries from reaching excessive budget deficit and public debt 
values.  This paper will attempt to contribute to fill in the gap as to what has happened in the last 
years in relation to maintaining the reference values in the face of, not only a temporary 
economic slowdown, but also in the face of a crisis.   
 
 Definition of Monetary Union 
 
 
 Before one can discuss the significance of the parameters or the factors that must be 
taken into consideration when establishing quantitative thresholds, whose fulfillment are 
supposed to ensure the stability of the member countries of a monetary union, one must first 
understand what a monetary union entails. Robert Mundell, a pioneer of the Theory of Optimal 
Currency Areas, defines a currency area as "a domain within which exchange rates are fixed".11 
In his influential paper Theory of Optimum Currency Areas Mundell (1961) describes two types 
of currency areas.  The first type is a currency area comprised of different regions (countries) 
under a common currency.  The second type consists of different countries, each with their 
national currency.12  For the purpose of this paper our interest lies in the first type.   
 Some of the benefits that a group of countries would gain from joining a currency area 
would be: a decrease in transactions costs, elimination of currency exchange risks, and an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 11 Mundell, R., A. (1961). A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. The American Economic Review, 51(4), 
657. 
 12 Ibid., 658. 
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increase in transparency.13 In the case of a monetary union with a common currency each 
member country gives up its national currency on behalf of a new single (common) currency.  
Consequently, the adoption of this common currency also implies the creation of a single central 
bank.14 As Benjamin J. Cohen states “monetary union means complete abandonment of separate 
national currencies and full centralization of monetary authority in a single joint institution.”15 
Just as Mundell did in the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas Cohen also makes reference to 
variations in the structure of currency areas, but as previously mentioned this author is interested 
in the case of a currency area with a common currency and an independent central bank in 
charge of monetary policy.  
 
 Implications of Joining a Monetary Union  
 
 
 Among the implications of joining a monetary union is the loss of a national currency and 
with that, the ability to use exchange rates as a mechanism to correct any external imbalances. In 
other words, a country loses its ability to use its currency to increase competitiveness.16 
Devaluation and revaluation are no longer viable options for helping stabilize the economy. 
Since currency devaluation is not an option the country has to resort to implementing internal 
devaluation.  An internal devaluation tends to be more painful for the population and the time it 
takes to achieve the goal of reducing labor costs is usually prolonged. Internal devaluation 
implies cutting wages, as the government tries to increase competitiveness by reducing labor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13 (2012, June 14).  Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area [Web log post]. Retrieved from 
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/revenge-of-the-optimum-currency-area/ 
 
 14 Mundell, 657. 
 
 15 Cohen, B. J. (2008, Feb. 10). Monetary Unions. In EH.Net Encyclopedia. Retrieved from 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/cohen.monetary.unions 
 
 16 Mundell, 659. 
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costs, which as Paul Krugman points out encounters more resistance.  A reduction in wages may 
be particularly problematic during economic slowdowns because there is no guarantee that prices 
will also fall. Thus, putting pressure on households.17  On the other hand, a currency devaluation 
effects “a de facto wage cut”.18 Compared to internal devaluations currency devaluations have 
demonstrated to be less painful and less politically problematic.  
 There is an agreement among economists that the greatest sacrifice a country makes 
when joining a currency area, and giving up its national currency, is the loss of flexibility.19 This 
loss might not be as noticeable or as appreciated when a country’s economy is doing well.  It will 
be during economic slowdowns that the loss of flexibility will be especially felt, and when the 
implications of this loss will become more apparent. Paul Krugman refers to “a loss of a 
mechanism for adjustment.”20  There are benefits to joining a currency area but there are also 
costs.  Following this line of thought, Krugman argues that in the case of an exchange rate area 
“these costs arise because a country that joins an exchange rate area gives up its ability to use the 
exchange rate and monetary policy for the purpose of stabilizing output and employment.”21 The 
benefits that derive from joining a currency area are expected to outweigh the costs and policy 
limitations that membership might entail. 
 The obvious implication of joining a monetary union is, as stated above, the loss of a 
sovereign national currency and control over monetary policy.  But what exactly does the loss of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 17 Krugman, P.  (2011, Jan. 12) Can the euro be saved? The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
 
 18 Ibid. 
 
 19 Friedman, M. (1968, March). The Role of Monetary Policy. The American Economic Review, LVIII (1). 
 
 20 Krugman, Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area.  
 
 21 Krugman, P. & Obstfeld, M. (2003). Optimum Currency Areas and the European Experience. 
International Economics: Theory and Policy (7th ed.). Boston: Addison-Wesley, 577. 
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monetary policy entail?  The monetary authority, in this case the central bank, controls the 
money supply.  In the case of a currency union, with a single currency, there is a centralization of 
monetary authority under a single institution. This means that a country cannot influence the 
money supply available since it is no longer in control of the money supply for that country’s 
particular currency.  With regard to monetary policy the monetary authority’s main mechanisms 
to maintain a stable economy are interest rates, open-market operations and the reserve ratio.  
The two main types of monetary policy are expansionary and contractionary policies. 
Contractionary monetary policy is usually implemented when the economy is either growing or 
expected to grow too fast with the implicit inflationary risk.  There tends to be a reduction in the 
money supply due to an increase in interest rates, the reserve ratio and the sale of bonds by the 
central bank.  An expansionary monetary policy (also known as quantitative easing – QE) is 
regularly implemented when the economy is in recession or is growing very slowly.  Countries in 
a currency area can neither print money nor implement monetary policy to stabilize their 
economies.   
 Relinquishing control over monetary policy is not something trivial. Due to the monetary 
authority’s role in stabilizing economic growth, it is worth analyzing what the implications of a 
“one-size-fits-all monetary policy” are.22  Milton Friedman (1968) argues the importance of 
monetary policy in The Role of Monetary Policy.  Friedman lists three main capabilities of 
monetary policy: 
 1. Prevents money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance. 
 2. Provides a stable background for the economy. 
 3. Contributes to offsetting major disturbances in the economic system arising from other 
 sources. 23 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 22 Krugman, Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area. 
 
 23 Friedman, 12-14. 
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 Joining a monetary union requires fiscal discipline by the countries that comprise it.  
Since these countries have to ensure the well being of their economy and their people they must 
follow policies that allow them some flexibility during economic slowdowns. One of Keynes 
central arguments was that there should be more fiscal discipline in good times, deficits should 
be avoided, in order to save up for when the economy is not doing as well. In the words of Henry 
Farrell and John Quiggin “John Maynard Keynes argued that surpluses should be accumulated 
during good years so that they could be spent to stimulate demand during a bad one”. 24  
 
Use of Fiscal Policy 
   
 Fiscal policy refers to "the use of government spending and taxation to influence the 
economy".25 In general, fiscal policy is divided in three categories  
 (1) Policies concerning government purchases of goods and services, (2) policies 
 concerning taxes, and (3) policies concerning transfer payments (such as  unemployment 
 compensation, social security benefits, welfare payments, and veteran's benefits). 26 
 
In a currency union, the only tool for economic stabilization for each individual country is fiscal 
policy.  
 The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas describes the optimal characteristics for sharing 
a common currency.  Even if countries involved in a currency area share some characteristics 
they are still individual countries, with different strengths and weaknesses. Among their 
differences is the composition of their economy. One country may specialize in manufacturing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 24 Farrrell, H. & Quiggin, J.  (2011, May/June).   How to Save the euro- and the EU: Reading Keynes in 
Brussels.  Foreign Affairs, 90 (3), 100. 
 
 25 Weil, D. N.  (n.d.).  Fiscal Policy.  In The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Retrieved from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/FiscalPolicy.html 
 
 26 Case, K. L. & Fair, R. C. (2004). The government and fiscal policy. In Principles of Macroeconomics 
(7th ed.) (pp.161-181). New Jersey: Pearson Prentice Hall, 161. 
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while the other may depend more on tourism. When all sectors of the economy are doing well a 
one-size-fits-all monetary policy might not seem too problematic. It is when the different 
countries find themselves out of sync concerning the business cycle (be it due to a decrease in 
demand, etc.) that the strain of having a centralized monetary union might be felt. This is due to 
the fact that, while one country might be trying to stimulate demand the general monetary policy 
might be concerned with rising inflation in the currency area.  As in the example just mentioned, 
it may occur that the monetary authority of the currency area conducts a monetary policy that 
might be counterproductive to a member country’s economic objectives.   
          The government is in charge of fiscal policy.  Even as government intervention continues 
to be a contentious subject in economics, its influence over the economy cannot be denied.  John 
Maynard Keynes argued in favor of government intervention to correct economic instability.  
Members of a currency union must rely on fiscal policy to compensate for the lack of an 
independent monetary policy. Fiscal policy is primarily concerned with fighting unemployment 
and inflation. When do countries typically use it? Governments tend to use fiscal policy to 
“promote strong and sustainable growth and reduce poverty”.27  
 Just as with monetary policy, fiscal policy can be expansionary or contractionary. 
Expansionary fiscal policy is usually used when the economy is in recession while 
contractionary fiscal policy tends to be implemented when the economy is growing too fast.  
Expansionary fiscal policy involves increasing government spending while reducing taxes.  
Since the main goal of applying expansionary fiscal policy is to stimulate the economy this 
generally tends to lead to an increase in aggregate demand and a decrease in unemployment.  On 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 27 Horton, M. & El-Ganainy, A. (2012, March 28). Fiscal policy: taking and giving away. Finance & 
Development Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/fiscpol.htm 
	   15	  
the other hand, contractionary fiscal policy tends to be used to prevent inflation and it involves a 
decrease in government spending and an increase in taxes. 
 Fiscal policy objectives tend to vary.  Mark Horton and Asmaa El-Ganainy give an 
excellent example of factors that might be taken into consideration when deciding fiscal policy 
objectives, 
 In the short term, priorities may reflect the business cycle or response to a natural 
 disaster or a spike in global food or fuel prices. In the longer term, the drivers can  be 
 development levels, demographics, or natural resource endowments.28   
  
If the economy is in recession, it calls for expansionary fiscal policy, whose implementation 
leads to an increase in the budgetary deficit.  If the economy is experiencing an inflationary 
spiral contractionary fiscal policy should be implemented, leading to a possible increase in the 
budgetary surplus. In other words, balancing the budget is antagonistic with simultaneous 
consistent application of fiscal policy.  The dilemma arises when the deficit in the budget leads 
to debts that require borrowing, especially if the borrowing is done from international 
organizations.  Experience has shown that lenders often require the implementation of 
contractionary fiscal policy to balance the budget of the borrower to reduce the risk of not being 
paid back.  Evidence shows that austerity measures embedded in contractionary fiscal policy lead 
to balancing the budget rather than to growth.   
   
Role of Economic Parameters 
 
 
 What is the role of economic parameters? It allows one to monitor the economic behavior 
of a particular country. Due to the need to maintain a stable currency area it is necessary to be 
more aware of the economic behavior of those countries involved.  Since monetary policy is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 28 Horton, M. & El-Ganainy, Fiscal policy: taking and giving away.  
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centralized, the behavior of the monetary authority does not need to be monitored as closely. But 
due to the fact that each country can pursue its own independent fiscal policy, it might be harder 
to be informed of the current condition of a country’s economy.   
 Among the most relevant economic parameters would be the budget balance, public debt 
and GDP growth.   The budget balance measures government expenditures and revenues in a 
given year.  A budget deficit is not necessarily considered to be a sign of bad economic behavior.  
Rather, one has to look at how large the deficit is in relation to the GDP, as well as the 
endogenous or exogenous causes of the deficit. The result of the net accumulation of deficits is 
the public debt. The public debt/GDP indicator allows one to see how dependent on borrowing a 
country might be to sustain its economy and whether this level of borrowing is sustainable in the 
long run.  All these parameters are interrelated.   
 As with a budget deficit, “the manner in which debt builds up can be important”.29 A high 
level of public debt can affect growth, 
 A higher level of public debt implies that a larger share of society’s resources is 
 permanently being spent servicing the debt.  This means that a government intent  on 
 maintaining a given level of public services and transfers must raise taxes as debt 
 increases.  Taxes distort resource allocation, and can lead to lower levels of 
 growth. 30 
 
Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff (2010) analyzed the effect of government debt on 
real GDP growth in their paper Growth in a Time of Debt.  They used four ranges for debt levels: 
low debt, medium debt, high debt and very high debt. 31 Based on their analysis they concluded 
that once government debt reached a certain threshold, different for developed and developing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 29 Reinhart, C. M. & Rogoff, K. S. (2010, May) Growth in a time of debt. American Economic Review: 
Papers & Proceedings, 573-578. 
 
 30 Cecchetti, S. G, Mohanty, M.S. & Zampolli, F.  (2010, May).  The future of public debt: prospects and 
implications.  BIS Working Papers No. 300, 12-13. 
 
 31 Reinhart & Rogoff, 7. 
 
	   17	  
countries, the rate of growth decreased. In other words, there were “notably lower growth 
outcomes”.32  
 Lastly, we have the GDP growth rate.  The GDP growth rate is important because it gives 
one an overall picture of the condition of a country’s economy.  If the economy is growing it is 
assumed that the country is doing well and, all things constant, it is expected to continue doing 
well.  However, one has to be wary of relying solely on GDP growth as an indicator without 
looking at its structure.  It is important to know the origin of that growth; whether it is related to 
external factors or if it is due to an increase in the price of a particular good, or whether it is due 
to the diversification of the economy.   
 
Debt: Fiscal Adjustments and Imbalances 
 
 
 There are several factors that can lead to fiscal imbalances, some of which may be 
beyond a government’s control. A fiscal imbalance basically represents a gap between the ability 
to generate revenue and the expenditures a government must account for.  Fiscal policy must also 
be used carefully because it is not uncommon to relate it to budget deficits, especially in what 
concerns government fiscal transfers.  The implementation of expansionary fiscal policy during a 
recession will probably lead to an increase in the budget deficit, if the economy has not 
previously accumulated a surplus.  Since the government is stimulating the economy it is 
probably investing more in programs that will encourage an increase in economic activity, and 
an increase in demand.  It will also present a decrease in tax revenues since it does not want to 
strain the already weakened consumers and businesses.  An increase in unemployment is usually 
accompanied by an expansion of unemployment benefits in order to lessen the burden of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 32 Ibid., 22. 
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people.  This, of course, puts more pressure on government expenditures, which might have been 
unprepared to address the added burden.33 A deficit will then lead to the need to borrow, either 
domestically or internationally, thereby fueling an increase in public debt.  Depending on the 
borrowing terms, specifically on the bond yield, a country might find it very hard or costly to 
borrow.  In a currency area if a country has a high level of public debt plus high borrowing costs 
it could later become a problem for the other member countries, as it may threaten the stability of 
the common currency.   
  One of the most important factors that may lead to fiscal imbalances, especially at this 
point in time, is the rapidly aging population.  There are several costs related to an aging 
population that might not be accounted for in the budget projections.  These are long-term costs 
but they are very important because they represent a future liability for the government.34  Where 
do these costs come from? Age-related costs will be primarily reflected by pension and health 
care costs.  Not only is this a liability because of the number of people who will represent an 
added cost to the government but also because of the continually rising health care costs and the 
increase in life expectancy. 35  The support ratio, the ratio of the working population (numerator) 
to the retired population (denominator), will necessarily be affected.36  The ratio declines as a 
result of either a decrease in the working age population or an increase in the retired population. 
Even if the government cannot fully control the change in the ratio it can exert some influence in 
increasing the numerator by increasing employment and/or extending the retirement age of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 33 Arestis, P. & Malcolm, S.  (2010, April).  The return of fiscal policy.  Journal of Post Keynesian 
Economics, 32(3), 329. 
 
 34 Cecchetti, S. G, Mohanty, M.S. & Zampolli, F.  (2010, May).  The future of public debt: prospects and 
implications.  BIS Working Papers No. 300, 1. 
 
 35 Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 6. 
 
 36 Ibid. 
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labor force, and having a flexible immigration policy. Age-related costs are dangerous because 
since they are more long-term they act almost as hidden costs, leading to governments being 
unprepared to deal with them.37   
 With regard to fiscal adjustments, in order to stabilize the economy the government might 
either tighten or loosen fiscal policy.  Usually, in periods of recession governments promote 
fiscal stimulus.38  However, when the country has a high level of debt, expansionary fiscal policy 
would find it harder to promote growth. In the paper The future of public debt: prospects and 
implications Cecchetti, Mohanty and Zampolli (2010) state that “the existence of a higher level 
of public debt is likely to reduce both the size and the effectiveness of any future fiscal response 
to an adverse shock.”39 A high level of debt also becomes problematic because if it is deemed to 
be excessive, not only by the national government but also by the international community, the 
national government might find itself having to apply contractionary fiscal policy to try to reduce 
it.  Cecchetti notes, “but fiscal restraint tends to deliver stable debt; rarely does it produce 
substantial reductions”.40 As mentioned in the previous section, fiscal tightness and austerity do 
not foster growth, that is the basis for the automatic stabilizers, which are instrumental for 
balancing the budget without the implementation of contractionary fiscal policy, to kick in.  In 
the case of a country having a high debt level the absence of an independent monetary policy 
will also be felt.  An independent monetary policy would allow the currency to be devalued to try 
to increase competitiveness to promote growth and subsequently, try to reduce debt through a 
combination of fiscal and monetary policy.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   37  Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 1. 
 
 38 Arestis & Malcolm, 331. 
 
 39 Cecchetti, Mohanty, & Zampolli, 14. 
 
 40 Ibid., 1. 
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The Relationship Between Growth and Social Justice 
 
 
Growth does not necessarily lead to democracy and social justice. There has been a growing  
interest in the effect of factors such as inequality and corruption on growth. Some countries 
might register higher levels of growth while reducing income inequality. However, this is not 
always the case.  Several parameters to be considered in relationship to growth are the gini 
coefficient, poverty rate, index of democracy, index of economic freedom, human development 
index, and corruption perception index.   The calculation of the aforementioned indexes is one of 
the best ways to know how much growth has contributed to social justice. The gini coefficient 
measures “the extent to which the distribution of income … among individuals or households 
within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.”41  Fuad Hasanov and Oded 
Izraeli analyzed economic data from 48 states in the U.S. to try to answer the question of 
whether inequality is good or bad for growth.  Their findings were that growth tends to be 
negatively affected by low and high levels of inequality.42  
 The OECD defines the poverty rate as “the ratio of the number of people who fall below 
the poverty line and the total population.”43  A study conducted by several World Bank 
economists revealed that, “a 10 percent drop in poverty levels, other things being equal, can 
increase economic growth by one percent. In turn, a 10 percent increase in poverty levels lowers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   41 OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms – Gini index definition. (2002, Aug. 9). OECD.org. Retrieved from 
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=4842 
 
 42 Hasanov, F. & Izraeli, O. (2012, Jan.-Feb.).  How much inequality is necessary for growth?  Harvard 
Business Review the Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.hbr.ogr/2012/01/how-much-inequality-is-necessary-for-
growth/ar/1 
 
 43 OECD. (2010). Poverty rates and gaps. In OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social 
Statistics. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/factbook-2010-89-en 
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the growth rate by one percent.”44  The relationship between a high poverty level and growth 
creates a vicious cycle as the poor are unable to participate in economic activities related to 
growth. High poverty leads to low growth and low growth leads to high poverty.45 
 The Index of Democracy, which is calculated by the Economist Intelligence Unit, 
evaluates the democratic standing of a country on the basis of five categories: 1) electoral 
process and pluralism, 2) civil liberties, 3) the functioning of government, 4) political 
participation, and 5) political culture.46  Another parameter mentioned above was the index of 
economic freedom.  The Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation developed this index in 
order to monitor what they describe as “economic freedom” around the world.  Economic 
freedom is defined as “the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and 
property.”47  This is measured based on components of four categories: 1) rule of law, 2) limited 
government, 3) regulatory efficiency, and 4) open markets.48  The benefits associated with a 
higher level of economic freedom according to the sponsors of this index are a demonstrated 
positive relationship between economic freedom and positive social and economic values, “such 
as per capita income, economic growth rates, human development, democracy, the elimination of 
poverty, and environmental protection.”49                                                                                 
 Among the most reliable indicators of social and economic development is the Human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   44 Latin America Needs to Cut Poverty to Boost Growth.  (2006, Feb. 14). The World Bank. Retrieved from 
http://go.worldbank.org/D32PM6TTD0 
 
 45 Ibid. 
 
 46 The Economist. Democracy Index: Liberty and justice for some. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/8908438 
 
 47 The Heritage Foundation. 2013 Index of Economic Freedom.  Retrieved from 
http://www.heritage.org/index/about 
 
 48 Ibid. 
 
 49 The Heritage Foundation. 2013 Index of Economic Freedom.  
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Development Index (HDI), which is obtained through a combination of life expectancy, 
educational attainment and income indicators.50  The last parameter to consider in relation to 
growth and social justice is the Corruption Perception Index, sponsored by Transparency 
International.  The Corruption Perceptions Index “measures the perceived levels of public sector 
corruption” in various countries and territories.51  In the case of a currency union it is important 
to maintain a balance between growth and social justice. The existence of social justice in the 
region lowers the probability of conflicts arising in individual countries that might affect the 
stability of the monetary union as a whole. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Case of the European Union 
 
	  
Brief Historical and Political Background 
 
                   The origins of the European Union can be traced back to the European Coal & Steel 
Community, which was established after the Second World War.  One of the main reasons cited 
as a motivation for the creation of what would later become the European Union was Europe's 
recent history that included World War I and World War II. The economic and human 
devastation that resulted from the two wars became one of the incentives for European countries 
to form long lasting bonds among themselves, in order to prevent a repetition of these events. 
Developing tighter relationships would in turn increase the costs of going to war with each other, 
thus making it harder for a WWIII to occur. It was thus that the European Coal & Steel 
Community became the first formal organization of what would later become the European 
Union. The increase in economic integration in Europe was also accompanied by an enlargement 
of the organizations that were formed throughout the last half-century which came to be known 
as the bases of what today is known as the European Union.  This integration process reached its 
peak with the establishment of the European Monetary Union, set in the Maastricht Treaty, with 
the euro becoming its most important accomplishment.  
                 Europe's violent history was only part of the reason for the desire to create an 
organization that would unite Europe's nations.  Another reason was political. After WWII the 
United States influence in the world arena had greatly increased. Having just emerged from a 
war and having to face not only large economic costs but also large infrastructure damage, 
accompanied by large human casualties, European countries saw their power and influence 
dwindling in the global sphere. 
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                The Marshall Plan was an American aid program for Europe drawn up in 1947 and put 
into effect in 1948.  This plan was designed to help Europe with the post-WWII reconstruction 
process. The United States wanted political stability, peace, and the return of a “normal 
economic health in the world.”1 With the aid of the United States, Europe was able to develop 
once again.  At this time, the U.S. dollar became the sole currency to be negotiated.  This 
continued until 1971 when the U.S. experienced its first balance of trade deficit, which marked 
the end of the Bretton Woods system. 
                 It was at this time that the idea of a union to counterbalance the United States’ 
influence emerged, as the U.S. was slowly loosing its status as a hegemon.  A united Europe 
could compete on a more leveled playing field with the U.S. through the development of a 
stronger voice in the international arena.2 During the second-half of the 20th century a series of 
organizations were established with the goal of strengthening European unity.  However, it was 
not until 1992, when the Treaty of Maastricht was signed, that a more solid foundation was 
established, giving birth to the European Union.  This treaty also became the pillar of what is 
known as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 3 The Eurozone was then established, 
culminating with the launch of the euro in 1999. 
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 2 Anderson, P. (2009).  The New Old World. London: Verso. 
 
  3 Treaty of Maastricht on European Union. (2010). Europa.eu. Retrieved from 
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Paul Krugman’s Analysis of the Lack of Fulfillment of the Conditions for an Optimal 
Currency Area  
	  
	  
                      Many economists were skeptical of the creation of a European Monetary Union 
because they considered its foundations to be unstable.  Among these economists we have Paul 
Krugman. Krugman has repeatedly argued that Europe did not, and does not, have the 
institutions necessary to create a common currency area.4  Throughout his papers and lectures 
focusing on this topic he emphasizes the preconditions that should have been fulfilled in order 
for a monetary union to be established.  Referring to Robert Mundell he mentions factor 
mobility, focusing on labor, as a necessary characteristic of a monetary union.   
                      He focuses on labor because it is one of the main factors affected by an asymmetric 
shock.  Labor mobility is important because during an economic downturn a particular area 
might be more affected than another leading to a rise in the unemployment rate due to a decrease 
in investment, etc.  In the event that the unemployment rate rises it can be decreased through 
emigration, as the labor force decreases and comes more in line with the jobs available.5   This 
allows the unemployment rate to decrease.  Krugman notes that there is limited labor mobility in 
the European Union.  In his paper Can the euro be saved? he compares the United States to 
Europe.  One of the factors of comparison is labor mobility in both currency areas.  In his 
analysis of the differences between what could be referred to as the United States currency area 
and the Eurozone he notes that the relatively cultural homogeneity in the United States, 
beginning with the use of English, makes moving from one state to another and looking for a job 
much more possible. He states in fact that labor mobility is very common in the U.S. while in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 4 Krugman, Can the euro be saved?  
 
 5 Krugman, Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area.  
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Europe it is not.  One of the main barriers to labor mobility in Europe is language.6  However, 
there are also institutional differences, such as the existence of closed shopped jobs and different 
requirements to practice certain jobs (specially professional jobs) in every member country.7  
The institutional differences are related to the fact that Europe’s labor market is heavily 
regulated.   
             Krugman also cites fiscal integration as a key component in a currency union.  Once 
again he makes reference to a European and a U.S. state and how the outcomes of an asymmetric 
shock would vary based on their different structures as currency unions.  Unlike the European 
Union, that is only a monetary union, the United States is also a fiscal union.  This changes a 
state’s or member country’s economic situation considerably.  In the case of the U.S., if one of 
its states where to suffer a financial or economic crisis the federal government would be able to 
help through resource transfers.8  Financing of diverse programs, such as unemployment 
benefits, is still possible because it is the federal government not the state that pays for them.   A 
member of the European Monetary Union does not have this leverage and this is partly why its 
economy might be much more affected by a crisis.  In the case of an asymmetric shock a 
member state has to rely primarily on itself.  This lack of fiscal union is particularly palpable 
right now, as default became a very real possibility for several of its member states.  It has also 
become apparent that the existing institutions are not equipped to handle large crises.  The 
possibility of creating a governing body that can help member countries in times of need has 
been a bureaucratic headache, as a consensus is hard to reach.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 6 Krugman, Can the euro be saved?  
	  
 7 Ibid. 
 
	   8 Krugman, Revenge of the Optimum Currency Area. 	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               The condition of free capital mobility might be considered to have been met.  As capital 
is largely handled through technological means there are no barriers to its free movement across 
borders. An interesting relationship can be observed between labor rigidity and capital flow.  It is 
plausible that labor rigidity facilitates capital flow, since labor limitations makes it more likely to 
have capital investments.  Free movement of labor in the European Union would probably limit 
movement of capital as wage levels would not vary as much from country to country.  
                     Lastly, Krugman, just as other economists have already done, agrees that while 
there has been an increase in trade it has not been as dramatic as it was first expected.9  The 
adoption of the euro, the most powerful symbol of the monetary union, did reduce transaction 
costs and risks but it did not lead to the expected intra-European trade increase.     
                    
The division Between Northern and Southern Eurozone Countries 
	  
	  
              Differences among the existing member countries have always existed.  In fact, part of 
the European project consisted in providing funds to those member countries that were lagging 
behind. These economic differences became less pronounced by the development of the 
European Monetary Union and the adoption of the euro. Due to the euphoria caused by the 
apparent success of the euro the differences seemed to decrease as the Eurozone continued to 
grow and individual economies appeared to be performing well.  However, the economic   
performance and the financial behavior of the member countries came under scrutiny after the 
2008 financial crisis.  It was at this point that an invisible line was drawn again which separated 
them into what came to be informally referred to as the Northern and Southern countries.  
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              The Northern and Southern countries are not just referred to as such because of their 
geographical location. When talking about members of the Eurozone they imply common 
economic characteristics among members.  The Northern countries are economically stronger 
and are considered, for the most part, to have sound fiscal policies in place.  The Southern 
countries are economically weaker and are also considered to follow less sound fiscal policies.  
Even with the creation of the Stability and Growth Pact which established the conditions, that 
had to be met and maintained, in order to be accepted and maintain membership in the Eurozone, 
the economic convergence that its proponents expected did not take place.  As the case of 
Greece, which manipulated its budget deficit figures in order to meet the membership 
requirements, illustrates.  Countries like Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium belong in the 
first group, while countries like Greece, Portugal, Italy and even Spain are considered Southern 
countries.   
 During the first half of the 2000s all of the countries were performing very well in 
economic terms.  Some countries, such as Ireland, experienced incredible rates of growth.  Yet, it 
was not until the 2008 world economic crisis occurred that the stability of each member country 
was more clearly known.  In terms of GDP growth the Northern countries experienced a very 
slight downturn or were still able to show some growth, even if small. Those countries that did 
experience a slowdown were able to recover in about a year.  On the other hand, most of the 
Southern countries are still trying to overcome the aftereffects of the crisis and have shown either 
a small, zero or negative GDP growth. See Table 1. 
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Table 1.  GDP growth 2002-2012 
Country	  
	  
2002	  
	  
2003	  
	  
2004	  
	  
2005	  
	  
2006	  
	  
2007	  
	  
2008	  
	  
2009	  
	  
2010	  
	  
2011	  
	  
2012	  Austria	   1.60	   0.91	   2.30	   2.73	   3.63	   3.68	   1.08	   -­‐3.50	   2.21	   2.69	   0.66	  Belgium	   1.36	   0.81	   3.25	   1.80	   2.67	   2.86	   0.95	   -­‐2.75	   2.42	   1.81	   -­‐0.20	  Finland	   1.83	   2.01	   4.13	   2.92	   4.41	   5.34	   0.29	   -­‐8.54	   3.32	   2.74	   -­‐0.20	  France	   0.94	   0.92	   2.33	   1.85	   2.64	   2.25	   -­‐0.19	   -­‐3.06	   1.57	   1.70	   -­‐0.01	  Germany	   0.03	   -­‐0.39	   0.69	   0.85	   3.89	   3.39	   0.80	   -­‐5.08	   4.03	   3.10	   0.87	  Greece	   3.44	   5.94	   4.37	   2.28	   5.51	   3.54	   -­‐0.22	   -­‐3.14	   -­‐4.94	   -­‐7.10	   -­‐6.80	  Ireland	   5.66	   3.88	   4.40	   5.89	   5.42	   5.43	   -­‐2.14	   -­‐5.47	   -­‐0.78	   1.42	   0.60	  Italy	   0.45	   0.03	   1.56	   1.09	   2.27	   1.55	   -­‐1.16	   -­‐5.50	   1.77	   0.56	   -­‐2.38	  Netherlands	   0.08	   0.32	   2.03	   2.17	   3.46	   3.91	   1.77	   -­‐3.66	   1.57	   1.08	   -­‐0.90	  Portugal	   0.76	   -­‐0.91	   1.56	   0.78	   1.45	   2.37	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐2.91	   1.94	   -­‐1.55	   -­‐3.20	  Spain	   2.71	   3.09	   3.26	   3.59	   4.08	   3.48	   0.89	   -­‐3.74	   -­‐0.37	   0.40	   -­‐1.30	  
Source: Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit, GDP (% real change), (2013). 
 
 
  In terms of debt, the Northern countries have smaller public debts than the Southern 
countries.  The higher debt of Northern countries, such as Germany, is largely due to their central 
role in helping maintain the Eurozone afloat.  Most Southern countries present a higher level of 
debt than the 60 percent established in the Stability and Growth Pact.  Another important 
indicator of the difference between these groups of countries is the budget deficit in relation to 
the GDP.  
 
Table 2. Budget deficit (% of GDP) 2002-2012 Country	   	  2002	   	  2003	   	  2004	   	  2005	   	  2006	   	  2007	   2008	   	  2009	   	  2010	   	  2011	   	  2012	  Austria	   -­‐0.90	   -­‐1.70	   -­‐4.60	   -­‐1.80	   -­‐1.70	   -­‐1.00	   -­‐1.00	   -­‐4.10	   -­‐4.50	   -­‐2.50	   -­‐3.10	  Belgium	   -­‐0.20	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐0.30	   -­‐2.70	   0.30	   -­‐0.10	   -­‐1.00	   -­‐5.60	   -­‐3.90	   -­‐3.90	   -­‐2.80	  Finland	   4.17	   2.50	   2.27	   2.69	   4.08	   5.34	   4.30	   -­‐2.49	   -­‐2.55	   -­‐0.56	   -­‐1.40	  France	   -­‐3.20	   -­‐4.10	   -­‐3.60	   -­‐2.90	   -­‐2.30	   -­‐2.80	   -­‐3.30	   -­‐7.60	   -­‐7.10	   -­‐5.20	   -­‐4.50	  Germany	   -­‐3.85	   -­‐4.15	   -­‐3.76	   -­‐3.32	   -­‐1.64	   0.24	   -­‐0.08	   -­‐3.08	   -­‐4.14	   -­‐0.78	   0.10	  Greece	   -­‐4.84	   -­‐5.71	   -­‐7.42	   -­‐5.64	   -­‐6.02	   -­‐6.76	   -­‐9.93	   -­‐15.61	   -­‐10.84	   -­‐9.50	   -­‐6.60	  Ireland	   -­‐0.30	   0.42	   1.40	   1.67	   2.93	   0.07	   -­‐7.35	   -­‐13.94	   -­‐30.86	   -­‐13.28	   -­‐8.20	  Italy	   -­‐3.00	   -­‐3.47	   -­‐3.48	   -­‐4.18	   -­‐3.31	   -­‐1.49	   -­‐2.70	   -­‐5.38	   -­‐4.59	   -­‐3.95	   -­‐3.00	  Netherlands	   -­‐2.11	   -­‐3.15	   -­‐1.77	   -­‐0.28	   0.52	   0.16	   0.49	   -­‐5.58	   -­‐5.02	   -­‐4.42	   -­‐3.80	  Portugal	   -­‐3.50	   -­‐3.80	   -­‐4.00	   -­‐6.50	   -­‐4.60	   -­‐3.30	   -­‐3.70	   -­‐10.20	   -­‐9.90	   -­‐4.40	   -­‐5.10	  Spain	   -­‐0.20	   -­‐0.40	   -­‐0.10	   1.30	   2.30	   1.90	   -­‐4.50	   -­‐11.20	   -­‐9.70	   -­‐9.50	   -­‐7.30	  
Source: Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
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 Unlike their southern counterparts the majority of the Northern countries have maintained their 
budget deficit within the established parameter of three percent.   
 Another characteristic of those countries identified as Northern is that they tend to have a 
more diversified economy.  Spain serves as an illustration of a less diversified economy.  Even 
though tourism is very important to its economy during the housing boom it invested heavily in 
housing. Consequently, its economy was primarily driven by tourism and housing.  When the 
bubble burst Spain started struggling for additional sources of revenue.    
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Chapter 3 
 
The Reality of the Fulfillments of the EU as a Result of the American Slowdown 
 
 
Analysis of the impact on the economic parameters of the Eurozone countries as a result of the 
American slowdown in 2008-2009 
 
 The collapse of Lehman Brothers not only impacted the U.S. economy but also marked 
the beginning of a crisis that would have overarching global effects.  The impact of the 
slowdown of the American economy on Europe had several dimensions. Due to how closely 
interlinked financial markets are, and the decision of some European banks to buy U.S. 
mortgages, European banks were exposed to the slowdown and in some cases suffered heavy 
losses.1 The burst of the property bubble not only affected the housing industry but also affected 
other sectors of the economy tied to this industry.2 Unemployment rose and overall demand fell 
in the U.S. The fall in demand was an important factor as the U.S. is an important non-European 
market for Eurozone members.   
 In order to analyze the impact that the American slowdown had on the Eurozone 
economies this author will compare GDP growth, budget balance, and public debt before and 
during the 2008-2009 period.  As shown in Table 1 (p. 29) Eurozone members’ economies have, 
overall, showed positive growth rates since their adoption of the euro.  There were only a few 
times in which several countries showed a slight contraction in their economies.  In 2008 several 
European countries had a negative growth rate but no major contractions.  The impact of the 
American slowdown can be fully appreciated when analyzing the growth rate for 2009. Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy towards the later part of 2008.  In 2009 all Eurozone members had 
a negative growth rate, the majority showing a dramatic contraction in their economy from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1 Stiglitz, J. E. (2010). Freefall. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 21. 
 
 2 Ibid. 
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previous year.  Countries like Finland went from having a 0.3 percent growth rate in 2008 to a -
8.5 in 2009.  The Netherlands went from having a 1.8 percent growth rate in 2008 to a -3.7 in 
2009. As can be observed even countries known for their economic soundness and their fiscal 
discipline were affected. 
 Regarding the budgetary balance, during the first part of the decade the majority of the 
Eurozone members that had a budget deficit stayed either within the 3 percent budget deficit 
limit or relatively close to it as shown in Table 2 (p. 29).  In 2008 some countries like Greece and 
Ireland did show a significant increase in their budget deficit, while Spain went from having a 
budget surplus to a deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP, but the majority maintained levels similar to 
those they had had in previous years. In 2009 one can observe significant increases in countries' 
budget deficits. Finland went from having a 4.3 budget surplus in 2008 to a 2.5 deficit as a 
percentage of GDP in 2009, while the Netherlands also went from a 0.5 percent surplus to a 5.6 
percent deficit. 
 In 2008 some countries like Greece and Ireland did show a significant increase in their 
budget deficit, while Spain went from having a budget surplus to a deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP, 
but the majority maintained levels similar to those they had had in previous years. In 2009 one 
can observe significant increases in countries' budget deficits. Finland went from having a 4.3 
budget surplus in 2008 to a 2.5 deficit as a percentage of GDP in 2009, while the Netherlands 
also went from a 0.5 percent surplus to a 5.6 percent deficit. The most dramatic changes can be 
observed in Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal where their deficits reached 15.6, 13.9, 11.2, and 
10.2 percent respectively. 
 The majority of Eurozone member countries had decreasing public debts since their 
adoption of the euro up to 2007. In table 3 one can observe that Belgium's public debt had 
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decreased to 84 percent of GDP in 2007. In that same year Finland and Ireland had a public debt 
of 35.2 and 25.1 percent respectively. With a few exceptions, such as Finland and Austria, 2008 
saw an increase in the public debt level of Eurozone members. Most increases in public debt 
ranged from 2 to 6 percent.  However, there were countries like the Netherlands and Ireland that 
did have increases of over 10 percent of their GDP in their public debt. 
 
Table 3. Public debt (% of GDP) 2002-2012 Country	   	  2002	   	  2003	   	  2004	   	  2005	   	  2006	   	  2007	   	  2008	   	  2009	   	  2010	   	  2011	   	  2012	  Austria	   69.20	   68.25	   68.78	   69.15	   66.25	   66.48	   62.15	   69.20	   71.48	   72.10	   75.60	  Belgium	   103.40	   98.40	   94.00	   92.00	   88.00	   84.00	   89.20	   95.70	   95.50	   97.80	   99.30	  Finland	   41.49	   44.54	   44.41	   41.73	   39.66	   35.18	   33.97	   43.55	   48.67	   49.16	   53.40	  France	   59.00	   63.14	   65.14	   66.74	   63.91	   64.19	   68.26	   79.18	   82.39	   86.05	   89.90	  Germany	   60.75	   64.44	   66.23	   68.55	   68.02	   65.21	   66.79	   74.48	   82.48	   80.54	   81.50	  Greece	   101.66	   97.45	   98.86	   101.23	   107.47	   107.23	   112.90	   129.69	   148.33	   170.55	   166.80	  Ireland	   32.01	   30.75	   29.46	   27.26	   24.62	   25.08	   44.50	   64.87	   92.14	   106.42	   117.80	  Italy	   105.13	   103.78	   103.46	   105.27	   105.84	   102.95	   105.63	   115.90	   118.74	   120.09	   127.10	  Netherlands	   50.47	   51.94	   52.48	   51.80	   47.33	   45.25	   58.44	   60.73	   63.16	   65.44	   72.10	  Portugal	   56.60	   59.20	   61.90	   67.70	   69.30	   68.30	   71.70	   83.20	   93.50	   108.10	   119.80	  Spain	   52.60	   48.80	   46.30	   43.20	   39.70	   36.30	   40.20	   53.90	   61.50	   69.30	   82.00	  
Source: Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
 
 
In 2009 one can observe significant increases in the public debt level from 2008. Finland went 
from a debt level of 34 to 43.6 percent, Austria from 62.2 to 69.2 percent, Greece went from 
112.9 to 129.7 percent, Ireland from 44.5 to 64.9 percent. 
 How can this slowdown be attributed to the United States’ economic situation in 2008-
2009? When analyzing the parameters it can be observed that countries like Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands returned to positive growth levels in 2010.  If the 
parameters show that all countries went into recession in 2009, including those that are 
considered to have more stable economies, but in 2010 some had recovered and were showing 
positive growth rates there had to be one factor that affected all of them.  This factor was the 
American slowdown.   
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The Emergence of Housing Industry Bubbles as a Result of Reckless Borrowing by Southern 
Countries 
 
 
 In order to understand how Southern countries, directly or indirectly, became the 
engineers of their individual housing bubbles one must first understand why they were able to 
borrow up to this point.  Economists agree that the reason is tied to the launch of the euro.  The 
launch of the euro led to a decrease in bond yields, as member countries’ government bonds 
were perceived to be of low risk similar to those of the strongest Eurozone economies.  The fall 
in bond yields allowed these countries to borrow more than they would have done at the levels 
registered before joining the single market. This led to a flow of cheap money during the 2002-
2008 period that in turn led to the fueling of the property bubbles in several member countries.3 
Southern countries borrowed beyond their means as their membership in the Eurozone seemed to 
act as a safety net against any possible reversal in the borrowing terms.   
 Through this access to easy credit, governments and private corporations started investing 
heavily in the housing industry.  The banks became involved as they provided loans to 
homebuyers and property developers as housing prices continued to rise. More people became 
involved in the property industry thus adding fuel to the bubble.4   
 
The Emergence of the Bailouts in Flagrant Violation of the Principles of the Eurozone 
 
 
 There were three pillars established to ensure the successful functioning and survival of 
the European Monetary Union, that is to say, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   3 Knight, L. (2012, May 18).  Spanish economy: What is to blame for its problems? BBC News. Retrieved 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17753891  
 
 4 Harvey, D. (2010). The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
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a rule against excessive deficits and public debt levels, a “no bail out” clause that  would 
make member governments responsible for their own debts, and a prohibition against the 
monetization of government debt (unsterilized ECB purchase of   members’ debt).5 
 
In principle, the “no bailout” clause in combination with the other pillars made it clear that fiscal 
misbehavior would not be tolerated and that each member country would have to be responsible 
for the consequences of their economic and fiscal decisions. Moral hazard was the main concern 
underlying these pillars.   
  In 2010 Greece became the first Eurozone country to be given a bailout amid controversy 
as to the larger implications of this violation of one of the Eurozone principles.  This principle 
was once again violated as Portugal was also bailed out just a few months after Greece.  If the 
bailouts to Greece and Portugal were already controversial, the second Greek bailout really 
brought the “no bailout” issue to the forefront.  The previous bailouts had been considered 
exceptions to the rule. A second bailout to a member country raised the question of whether it 
was worth risking more political and economic disagreement over a programme that may not 
produce the expected results.6 
 
 The Political Gridlock Resulting From the Bailouts 
 
 
 As a result of the bailouts the European political leaders got together to discuss the future 
of the Eurozone.  The political gridlock developed because the European leaders reached a 
political impasse as to what the next step should be.  Some called for further integration, hinting 
toward the possibility of the creation of a fiscal union that would complement the existing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   5 Haley, J. A. (2012, March 28).  Paradise Lost: The Maastricht Conditions and the Euro [Web log post]. 
Retrieved from http://www.cigionline.org/blogs/new-age-of-uncertainty/paradise-lost-maastricht-conditions-and-
euro 
 
 6 Munchau, W. (2012, Feb. 12). Why Greece and Portugal ought to go bankrupt. Financial Times.  
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monetary union.  Others called for the creation of an emergency fund.  However, the points of 
contention are always in the details of these possible solutions.  European leaders tend to 
disagree on the details. Questions such as: what would this action entail? who would provide the 
funding? how much would each member have to contribute and based on what criteria? what 
message would such a decision send to other member countries, the rest of their European 
counterparts, and the world? become problematic as each country looks after its own interests 
while simultaneously trying to address the larger issue affecting the union. In the case of the 
creation of an emergency fund countries with stronger economies worried that, since money was 
being put aside in case of an emergency, struggling countries would not be as incentivized to 
improve their fiscal behavior.   
 The bailouts also made political leaders more aware of how their citizens felt about these 
issues.  The growing discontent of the German population with the bailouts provided to Greece 
has been an important factor in Chancellor Merkel’s decision making.  This illustrates the many 
dimensions that are involved in European policymaking.  
 
 The Role of the Eurobonds 
 
 
 The idea of a Eurobond emerged as the European community searched for solutions to 
the European sovereign debt crisis, as countries like Greece and Portugal with higher debt levels 
struggled to maintain their economies afloat. Central to the possible creation and use of the 
Eurobonds is the stability of the euro.7 The constant threat of a possible default by any of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7 Eiffinger, S. (2011, April) Eurobonds – Concepts and implications. In European League for Economic 
Cooperation Cooperation, Cahier Comte Boël no. 15: How to strengthen the European Monetary Union (pp.7-16). 
Retrieved from http://www.elec-lece.eu/documents/pub/B15.pdf 
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economically weaker countries destabilizes the value of the euro as it brings up the question of 
how much longer will it exist. The delegitimization of the euro is a problem that affects all 
Eurozone members.   
 In theory the Eurobond would be a “ ‘pooled’ sovereign debt instrument of the Member 
States of the euro area".8 It would allow struggling countries to borrow at lower interest rates 
than they are currently doing.  They would provide these countries with much needed liquidity to 
stabilize their economy and try to get out of recession.  Eurobonds would be backed by the 
stronger Eurozone economies, which would reduce their risk of default as financial assets in 
comparison to bonds by the individual struggling economies.  Yields for Greek bonds are very 
high because they are perceived to be highly risky.  Since Eurobonds would have a financially 
sound base they would protect the euro from larger market shocks.9   
 Even if the survival and stability of the euro are the main reason for the creation of the 
Eurobonds they are a source of political controversy.  Why? Mainly, because Eurobonds are 
perceived as benefiting weaker economies, while incurring the costs on the stronger ones. It is 
true that Eurobond yields would be lower than the bond yields of countries like Greece, Portugal, 
Spain, or Ireland. However, for countries like Germany, Finland, Netherlands, and Austria, it 
would mean an increase in their current bond yields. Issing (2004) cited this as one of the reasons 
against a Eurobond as he said that countries with sound fiscal policies would have higher yields 
than they would have if they did not have a common Eurozone bond.  The issue of moral hazard 
is also brought up as countries with stronger economies argue that Eurobonds would be 
counterproductive to fixing fiscal behavior in the economically struggling countries. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 8 Ibid., 7. 
 
 9 Eiffinger, Eurobonds – Concepts and implications.   
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The Role of the German Chancellor and of Mr. Mario Draghi as New President of the ECB 
 
 
 The German Chancellor plays a very important role in the EU and the Eurozone.  As the 
political leader of one of the strongest economies in Europe, and of one of the original founding 
members of the European Union, Chancellor Angela Merkel is at the center of the decision-
making process in the EU.  As a European leader she has to consider what is in the best interest 
of the EU.  Her main goal is to ensure the stability of the system while making sure that it is also 
growing.  However the German Chancellor is first and foremost responsible to her constituents, 
the German citizens.10   
 Mario Draghi is the successor of Jean-Claude Trichet as President of the European 
Central Bank.  Just as the German Chancellor plays a very important role in helping maintain a 
stable European Union and Eurozone, the President of the European Central Bank is also 
entrusted with the mission of helping ensure the stability of the euro and in turn the Eurozone.  
Unlike his French counterpart, Draghi has shown the willingness to provide liquidity to the 
Eurozone banks in an effort to strengthen individual economies and thus the euro.  The flexibility 
shown by Mario Draghi in addressing the European sovereign debt crisis is partly possible 
because contrary to Chancellor Merkel he does not experience a conflict of interests between 
opposing positions.   
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   10 Morales-Pita, A. (2013, January). Analyzing the implications of the contradiction between the German 
Chancellor and the EU. Proceedings of 6th International Business and Social Sciences Research Conference 3 – 4, 
Dubai, UAE, ISBN: 978-1-922069-18-4, 15 pages.	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Chapter 4 
 
  The business cycle and the Eurozone 
 
 
 The regularities of the business cycle 
 
 Central to this paper’s argument is an understanding of the business cycle.  Wesley Clair 
Mitchell, an American economist, provided the most cited definition of a business cycle. He 
wrote,  
 Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic  activity of 
 nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises; a  cycle consists of 
 expansions occurring at about the same time in many economic activities, followed 
 by similarly general recessions, contractions, and revivals which merge into the 
 expansion phase of the next cycle.1 
  
Business cycles do not have a specific length rather they share specific characteristics in 
economic related behavior.  Concerning the duration of a business cycle Mitchell and Burns 
write, “this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary 
from more than one year to ten or twelve years.”2 Mitchell divided the two periods of the 
business cycle into four stages. The expansion period consists of the recovery/revival and 
prosperity stages. While the contraction period includes the crisis and depression stages. When it 
is a mild depression it is referred to as a recession.3  
       During these stages several economic indicators move together.  For example during a 
contraction one not only sees a decline in output (of goods and services), but one also observes 
an increase in unemployment. The opposite is true for an expansion period.   A period of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   1 Burns, A. F., & Wesley, C. M. (1946). Measuring Business Cycles. New 
York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2. 
 
 2 Ibid., 3. 
 
 3 Sherman, H. J.  (1991). The Business Cycle: Growth and Crisis Under Capitalism.  New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 11.	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expansion is characterized by a rise in output, and an increase in employment.4  Since output is 
the main economic indicator used to determine in what stage of the cycle a country is in, it is 
only natural to use GDP growth as a reference point when trying to define stages. Recession is 
generally identified by economists as the succession of negative GDP growth during two 
consecutive quarters.   It is important to remember that even as business cycles follow a certain 
pattern they are all still considered separate and unique entities.  Howard J. Sherman (1991) in 
his book The Business Cycle: Growth and Crisis under Capitalism notes that, “the business cycle 
is found in all capitalist countries, but the forms of the cycle are much influenced by 
international events and national peculiarities.”5   
 
 The Validity of the Requirements of the Eurozone Membership Criteria in the Context of the 
Different Phases of the Business Cycle 
 
 
        Due to the nature of a monetary union the main goal of its proponents and of the 
participants is to ensure that the economies of all its members are as synchronized as possible. In 
the case of the Eurozone the Maastricht eligibility criteria serves this purpose. The criteria was 
established to make sure that the public finance position of the member countries are not so 
different that it would endanger the survival of the union.  Through convergence they tried to 
synchronize, as much as possible, the business cycles of the participating economies. The 
eligibility criteria include the “sustainability” of the public finance position of the member 
country.6  The reference values that were provided to help ensure that sustainability can be found 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   4 Romer, C. D. (2008). Business Cycles. In The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Retrieved from 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BusinessCycles.html 
 
 5 Sherman, 31. 
 
 6 Pasinetti, 17-36.  
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in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure annexed to the Treaty of Maastricht and they 
are: 
 - 3 % for the ratio of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic product 
 at market prices; 
 - 60 % for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices.7 
 
These particular figures were established to prevent countries from accumulating excessive 
deficits, which are regarded as destabilizing to an economy.   
 It is important to consider not only the figures provided as reference values but also to 
delve deeper into why these particular values were chosen. Luigi L. Pasinetti (1998) analyzes the 
possible reasoning behind the budgetary balance and public debt reference values in his article 
European Union at the End of 1997: Who is within the Public Finance “Sustainability” Zone. 
Pasinetti concludes that these figures are a reflection of the economic situation at the time of the 
conception of the Maastricht Treaty, when most countries belonging to the European Community 
had an average public debt of about 60 percent.  Taking factors like the real rate of growth, the 
rate of inflation and the 60 percent public debt/GDP ratio into consideration implies that in order 
to maintain a non-increasing debt/GDP ratio the deficit/GDP ratio cannot be higher than 3 
percent.8  Pasineti notes that these values “represent a point on the boundary to the  
(sustainability) ‘zone’ in which the public debt to GDP ratio is either constant or decreasing." 9  
 The established limits on public debt and budget deficit do not account for the different 
phases of the business cycle.  A member country has to adhere to complying with these limits 
regardless of what phase of the cycle it finds itself in.  The lack of flexibility in the reference 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   7 Treaty on European Union. (1992, July 29). Official Journal C 191. Retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html#0084000006 
 
 8 Pasinetti, 19. 
 
 9 Ibid. 
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values assumes that the economies of all Eurozone member countries are always growing.  
However, this is not true.  Why? The literature concerning the increase in trade in the Eurozone 
due to the creation of a single market and a single currency says that even though there has been 
an increase in intra-European trade not all countries are benefited equally.  In order for a country 
to have a trade surplus there must be another country with a trade deficit, in order to balance out.  
The same logic applies to other economic indicators. If one country is doing well, there must be 
another country that is not doing as well.  Of course, there are exceptions like in 2009 when all 
European countries showed contractions in their economies.  Based on the understanding that 
countries will not always be constantly growing but that they will also go through periods of 
contraction, one cannot expect the parameters established by the Maastricht Treaty to accurately 
reflect the reality of the economic situation.   
 
 The Proposal of Establishing a Differentiated Scale for the Parameters in Function of at Least 
Two of the Phases, Namely Recovery and Recession 
 
 
 This paper’s proposal is that a scale has to be created that accurately reflects the 
movement of the economic indicators according to the phase of the business cycle a country’s 
economy is going through.  It has been mentioned that there are four phases to the business cycle 
but for the purpose of this paper we will only consider two phases, recovery and recession.  
These two phases reflect the most dramatic changes in the business cycle.  This author will focus 
her analysis on 10 of the 11 countries that first adopted the euro, in 1999, and Greece that joined 
in 2001, since they provide a larger data sample for investigation. 
 As previously mentioned 2009 was the only year since the adoption of the euro in which 
all Eurozone economies contracted. In 2009 only one country, Finland, stayed within the 
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established parameter of maintaining a 3 percent budget deficit/GDP ratio.  Germany had a 
deficit of 3.1 percent, which still surpasses the established limit.  The deficit of the rest of those 
referred to as Northern countries ranged from 4.1 to 7.6 percent: Austria had a deficit of 4.1 
percent, Belgium’s deficit reached 5.6 percent, France’s was 7.6 percent, and the Netherlands 
had a deficit of 5.6 percent, as shown in figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1. Budget balance (% of GDP) for the year 2009. Date from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2013). 
  
 
In that same year, 2009, the group referred to as Southern countries presented much higher 
budget deficits, with the exception of Italy, which had a 5.4 percent deficit. Greece had a 15.6 
percent budget deficit, the highest in the group, followed by Ireland with a 13.9 percent deficit.  
It is important to note that even some of the countries considered to be models of fiscal discipline 
failed to comply with the 3 percent deficit requirement.   
 In 2010 the Northern countries entered the recovery stage going from negative to positive 
growth rates. However, as shown in figure 2, with the exception of Finland, their budget deficits 
still exceeded 3 percent. Their budget deficits by country were: Austria 4.5 percent, Belgium 3.9 
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percent, France 7.1 percent, Germany 4.1 percent and the Netherlands 5 percent. From the 
Southern countries only Italy and Portugal showed an improvement in their GDP growth rate in 
this year.  Italy had a 4.6 percent deficit and Portugal a 9.9 percent deficit  
 
 
Figure 2. Budget balance (% of GDP) for the year 2010. Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2013). 
 
 
Now, let us look at the year 2006, a year in which these same 11 countries had a GDP growth of 
at least 1 percent.  In figure 3 one can observe that the majority of the countries had a deficit 
lower than 3 percent and that some even had budget surpluses.  Among those countries that 
exceeded the 3 percent limit there were Greece with a 6 percent budget deficit, Italy with a 
deficit of 3.3 percent and Portugal with a 4.6 percent deficit.   
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Figure 3. Budget balance (% of GDP) for the year 2006. Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(2013) 
 
 
 In order to provide an accurate comparison concerning the debt level we will be 
analyzing the same years (2009, 2010, and 2006) as those analyzed for the budgetary balance. In 
2009 the 11 member countries showed an increase in their public debt/GDP ratio compared to 
the previous year.  Most importantly, as shown in figure 4, only two of these countries had a 
public debt level lower than 60 percent, Finland with a 43.6 percent and Spain with 53.9 percent 
public debt. Out of the remaining countries three exceeded the 90 percent threshold determined 
by Dr. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff as being the level after which the ratio of public 
debt/GDP starts affecting the level of growth in developed countries; these countries were 
Belgium at 95.7 percent, Greece at 129.7 percent and Italy at 115.9 percent.  
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Figure 4. Public debt (% of GDP) for the year 2009. Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
 
 In 2010 all countries once again showed an increase in their public debt level.  Even 
those countries that were in the recovery phase still showed an increase in their public debt, even 
if it was very small.  
 
 
Figure 5. A comparison of public debt (% of GDP) during the years 2009 and 2010. Data from the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
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Countries like Austria went from a 69.2 percent to a 71.5 percent public debt/GDP ratio. Finland, 
which was the only country with a budget deficit lower than 3 percent, went from a 43.6 to a 
48.7 percent public debt. 
 When analyzing the public debt level of these countries in 2006 one can observe that 
while all the countries’ economies were growing, and had been growing during the previous 
years there were some countries that still exceeded the established 60 percent public debt limit. 
  
 
Figure 6. Public debt (% of GDP) for the year 2006.  Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). 
 
 
 After having analyzed the economic behavior of these countries in relation to different 
stages of the business cycle and having used the established reference values as a starting point 
this author has concluded that these reference values do not accurately reflect the economic 
behavior, as they should in relation to the business cycle.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
Because fiscal policy is the only stability mechanism available to the Eurozone members, 
it is of paramount importance to analyze the adequacy of the Maastricht Treaty thresholds 
established for the budget deficit and public debt as percentages of the GDP. Taking into 
consideration the stages of the business cycle, the author considers that the thresholds should be 
different for periods of recovery and recession.  
Analyzing the data for the Eurozone members in the period 2002 – 2012, the author 
differentiated as (a) periods of growth or recovery the years 2002-2008 and 2010-2011 for the 
Northern countries and 2002-2007 for the Southern countries; and as b) periods of recession the 
year 2009 for the Northern countries and 2008-2012 for the Southern countries. 
In relation to the budget deficit as a percentage of the GDP in the period of growth or 
recovery, most of the data showed that the majority of the Northern and Southern countries 
registered deficits ≤ 4%.  As far as the data for recession years are concerned, they were taken 
basically from the Southern countries with the exception of the year 2009 in which the majority 
of the Northern countries experienced recession. The result was an average of ≤ 8%. Therefore, 
this author recommends adopting a 4% threshold during recovery periods and an 8% threshold in 
periods of recession.  A similar procedure was followed with the determination of the public debt 
indicator, which was concentrated in the range ≤ 70% in periods of growth and ≤ 120% in 
periods of recession. Given the 90% threshold derived from Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff’s seminal work as a tipping point for a country to experience GDP rate decreases as a 
result of the public debt size, this author recommends adopting the 70% in periods of growth and 
90% in periods of recession. 
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 Unlike the 3% budgetary deficit/GDP ratio and the 60% public debt/GDP, the proposed 
differentiated scale would, on one hand, give the Eurozone members more flexibility in terms of 
fiscal policy; and, on the other hand, provide a more realistic way to accept new members of the 
monetary union.  
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